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ABSTRACT
IMMUNIZING BINARY EXECUTABLES AGAINST
RETURN-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING
Kaan Onarlıog˘lu
M.S. in Computer Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
July, 2010
Despite the numerous prevention and protection mechanisms that have been introduced
into modern operating systems, the exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities
still represents a serious threat to the security of software systems and networks. A
recent exploitation technique, called Return-Oriented Programming (ROP), has lately
attracted a considerable attention from academia.
ROP attacks utilize short code sequences each ending with a free-branch instruc-
tion, i.e. an instruction that allows the attacker to control the execution flow. Identi-
fying such sequences, or gadgets, available in binary executables and chaining them
together, it is possible to perform arbitrary computations. Past research on the topic
has mostly focused on refining the original attack technique, or on proposing partial
solutions that target only particular variants of the attack.
In this work, we present a compiler-based approach that represents the first prac-
tical solution against any possible form of ROP. Our solution is able to protect the
aligned free-branch instructions to prevent them from being misused by an attacker,
and to eliminate all unaligned free-branch instructions inside a binary executable. We
developed a prototype based on our approach for the x86 architecture, and evaluated
it by compiling GNU libc and a number of real-world applications. The results of
the experiments demonstrate that our solution is able to prevent any form of return-
oriented programming attack.
Keywords: Return-oriented programming, return-to-libc, memory corruption vulnera-
bilities.
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O¨ZET
I˙KI˙LI˙ YU¨RU¨TU¨LEBI˙LI˙RLERI˙N DO¨NU¨S¸E DAYALI
PROGRAMLAMAYA KARS¸I BAG˘IS¸IKLANDIRILMASI
Kaan Onarlıog˘lu
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
Temmuz, 2010
Modern is¸letim sistemlerinde bulunan birc¸ok o¨nlem ve koruma mekanizmasına
rag˘men, bellek bozma ac¸ıklarının istismarı yazılım sistemlerinin ve bilgisayar
ag˘larının gu¨venlig˘i ic¸in hala ciddi bir tehdit olus¸turmaktadır. Yakın gec¸mis¸te ortaya
atılan “Do¨nu¨s¸e Dayalı Programlama (DDP)” isimli istismar teknig˘i son zamanlarda
akademik ortamda oldukc¸a dikkat c¸ekti.
DDP saldırıları, serbest-dal yo¨nergeleriyle, yani bir saldırganın yu¨ru¨tme akıs¸ını
kontrol etmesine olanak sag˘layan yo¨nergelerle sonlanan kısa kod dizilerinden fay-
dalanır. I˙kili yu¨ru¨tu¨lebilirlerde mevcut olan bu tu¨r dizileri, dig˘er bir deyis¸le
aygıtları, tes¸his ederek ve bunları birbirlerine zincirleyerek keyfi hesaplamalar yap-
mak mu¨mku¨ndu¨r. Gec¸mis¸te bu konu u¨zerinde yapılan aras¸tırmalar c¸og˘unlukla oriji-
nal saldırı tekniklerinin gelis¸tirilmesi veya sadece belirli saldırı tu¨revlerini hedef alan
kısmi c¸o¨zu¨mler o¨nerilmesi u¨zerine odaklanmıs¸tır.
Bu c¸alıs¸mada, DDP’nin mu¨mku¨n olan her s¸ekline yo¨nelik ilk pratik c¸o¨zu¨mu¨
temsil eden, derleyici tabanlı bir yaklas¸ım sunuyoruz. C¸o¨zu¨mu¨mu¨z, bir saldırganın
ko¨tu¨ye kullanmasını engellemek amacıyla hizalı serbest-dal yo¨nergelerini koruya-
bilmekte ve ikili yu¨ru¨tu¨lebilirlerin ic¸erisindeki tu¨m hizasız serbest-dal yo¨nergelerini
ortadan kaldırabilmektedir. Yaklas¸ımımıza dayanarak x86 mimarisini hedefleyen bir
prototip gelis¸tirdik; GNU libc ve birkac¸ gerc¸ek uygulama derleyerek bu prototipi
deg˘erlendirdik. Deney sonuc¸larına go¨re, sundug˘umuz c¸o¨zu¨m her tu¨rlu¨ DDP saldırısını
engelleyebilmektedir.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler: Do¨nu¨s¸e-dayalı programlama, return-to-libc, bellek bozma ac¸ıkları.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the popularity of the Internet increases, so does the number of attacks against vul-
nerable services [5]. A common way to compromise an application is exploiting mem-
ory corruption vulnerabilities in order to divert the program execution to a location
under the control of the attacker. In this kind of attacks, the first step is to overwrite a
function pointer or a value which will eventually be copied to the instruction pointer
(e.g., the saved return address) in memory. Overflowing a buffer on the stack [7] or
exploiting a format string vulnerability [28] are well-known techniques used to this ef-
fect. Once the attacker is able to hijack the control flow of the application, the next step
is taking control of the program execution to perform some malicious activity. This is
typically done by injecting in the process memory a small payload that contains the
machine code to perform the desired task.
A wide range of solutions have been proposed to defend against memory corruption
attacks and to increase the complexity of performing these two attack steps [13, 20,
12, 14, 38]. In particular, all modern operating systems support some form of memory
protection mechanism [35] to prevent programs from executing code that resides in
certain memory regions. Protection mechanisms could be emulated in software by
the operating system or implemented in hardware using the No eXecute bit for the
CPUs that support it. Regardless of the technology, the goal is to protect against code
1
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injection attacks by setting the permissions of the memory pages that contain data
(such as the stack and the heap of the process) as non-executable.
One of the techniques to bypass non-executable memory involves reusing the func-
tionality provided by the exploited application as opposed to relying on injected code.
Using this technique, which was originally called return-to-lib(c) [33], an attacker can
prepare a fake frame on the stack and then transfer the program execution to the begin-
ning of a library function. Since some popular libraries (such as libc) contain a wide
range of functionality, this technique is still sufficient to take control of the program
(e.g., by exploiting the system function to execute /bin/sh and spawn a shell).
In 2007, Shacham [31] introduced an evolution of the return-to-lib(c) [33] attack
called Return-Oriented Programming (ROP). The main contribution of ROP is to show
that it is possible for an attacker to perform arbitrary computations and achieve Turing
completeness without injecting any new code inside the application. Shacham’s work
disproved the wrong intuition that preventing the injection of malicious code is enough
to prevent, or at least contain, malicious computations.
The idea behind ROP is simple: Instead of jumping to the beginning of a library
function, the attacker chains together sequences of instructions ending with a return
instruction (i.e., ret), called gadgets, that have been previously identified inside ex-
isting code. The large availability of gadgets in common libraries allows the attacker to
implement the same functionality in many different ways. Thus, removing potentially
dangerous functions (e.g., system) from common libraries is ineffective against ROP
and does not provide any additional security.
ROP is particularly appealing for rootkit development since it can defeat traditional
defense techniques based on kernel data integrity [39] or code verification [26, 30]. An-
other interesting domain is related to exploiting architectures with immutable memory
protection, for example, to compromise electronic voting machines as shown in [9].
This new technique also attracted the attention of the underground community and in
2010 we observed the first attacks in the wild using ROP to bypass Windows’ Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) technology [4].
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
The great interest around ROP quickly evolved into an arms race between re-
searchers. On the one side, the basic technique was refined and extended [8, 10, 36, 17].
On the other side, ad-hoc detection and protection mechanisms to mitigate the attack
were proposed [18, 23, 15, 11]. To date, existing solutions have focused only on the
basic attack, by detecting, for instance, the anomalous frequency of return instructions
executed [11, 18], or by removing the ret opcode from binary executables to prevent
gadget creation [22]. Unfortunately, a recent advancement in ROP [10] has already
raised the bar by adopting different instructions to chain the gadgets together, thus
making all existing protection techniques ineffective.
In this work, we generalize from all the details that are specific to a particular
exploitation technique to undermine the foundation on top of which return-oriented
programming is built: the availability of instruction sequences that can be reused by
an attacker. We present a general approach for the x86 architecture that combines dif-
ferent techniques to eliminate all possible sources of reusable instructions. Precisely,
we introduce a novel protection technique to prevent the attacker from misusing exist-
ing return or indirect jump/call instructions, and we use code rewriting techniques to
remove all unaligned instructions that can be used to link the gadgets.
We implemented our solution under Linux as a pre-processor for the popular GNU
Assembler. We then evaluated our tool on different real-world applications, with a
special focus on the GNU libc (glibc) library. Our experiments show that our
solution can be applied to complex programs and it is able to remove all possible
gadgets independent of the mechanism used to connect them together. A program
compiled with our system is on average 26% larger and 3% slower (in the case that all
the linked libraries are also compiled with our solution). This is a reasonable overhead
that is in line with existing stack protection mechanisms such as StackGuard [13].
This work makes the following contributions:
• We present a novel approach to prevent an attacker from reusing fragments of
existing code as basic blocks to compose malicious functionality.
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• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a general solution to
defeat all forms of ROP. That is, our solution can defend against both known
variations and future evolutions of the attack.
• We developed G-Free, a proof-of-concept implementation targeting the x86 ar-
chitecture to generate programs that are hardened against return-oriented pro-
gramming. Our solution requires no modification to the application source code
and can also be applied to system applications that contain large sections of as-
sembly code.
• We evaluated our technique by compiling gadget-free versions of glibc and
other real-world applications.
The rest of this thesis study is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide a
brief insight into traditional memory corruption vulnerabilities. In Chapter 3, we ana-
lyze the key concepts of return-oriented programming and identify the core technique
that is shared by all the possible attack variations. In Chapter 4, we present our ap-
proach for compiling gadget-free applications. In Chapter 5, we describe the details of
our prototype implementation. In Chapter 6, we show the results of the experiments
we conducted for evaluating the impact and performance of our system. Finally, in
Chapter 7, we briefly conclude the thesis.
Chapter 2
Memory Corruption Attacks &
Defenses
In this chapter, we provide a summary of the traditional memory corruption attacks
that paved the way for return-oriented programming, together with various defense
techniques proposed so far.
2.1 Traditional Attack Techniques
Buffer overflows are one of the most common ways to mount memory corruption
attacks. A buffer overflow occurs when a program overruns the bounds of a buffer
writing data to it and corrupts adjacent memory locations. This is usually caused by
programming errors such as improper bounds checking. If the written data is sup-
plied from user input, then an attacker can exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities to
overwrite pointers and data structures in the memory, or to inject malicious code into
the process. As a result, buffer overflows are the basis for many memory corruption
attacks.
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Two well-known forms of buffer overflows are stack-based overflows [7] and heap-
based overflows [24]. In a stack-based overflow, the attacker overflows a buffer on the
stack to overwrite the saved return address or a function pointer, in order to hijack
the execution control flow. In this way, when the executing function returns or the
modified function pointer is copied to the instruction pointer, execution jumps to a
memory location specified by the attacker. This memory location, which could also
be on the stack, typically contains malicious code injected by the attacker prior to
or during the buffer overflow. In a heap-based overflow, the overflown buffer resides
on the heap, which is dynamically allocated at runtime by the program. This attack
usually takes the form of altering the data structures and pointers used internally by
the heap allocation algorithm to hijack the control flow and execute injected code in a
similar manner to stack-based overflows.
Format string attacks [28] provide another technique for corrupting the memory. A
format string vulnerability occurs when user input is directly used as the format string
parameter in a function that performs string formatting, such as printf. With the
ability to specify any format string, the attacker can read memory (e.g., using the %x
format token) in order to identify the addresses storing critical values such as the saved
return address, and overwrite these addresses (e.g., using the %n format token) with
pointers to injected malicious code.
2.2 Non-Executable Memory Protection
Non-executable memory protection schemes aim to prevent execution of injected code
by marking those memory pages intended to store data as non-executable. In this way,
attempting to execute injected code on the stack or on the heap causes an exception,
averting many of the traditional memory corruption attacks.
Full non-executable memory protection requires support from the CPU, usually
called the NX (No-eXecute) bit technology, as well as from the operating system.
Some implementations also provide a limited software emulation of the protection if
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hardware support is not available.
Linux systems make non-executable memory protection available through
PaX [35] and ExecShield [37] patches. Microsoft provides an implementation called
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) since Windows XP SP2 and Windows Server 2003
SP1 [2]. OpenBSD offers a similar technology, named W⊕X, which enforces a mem-
ory region to be marked either as writable or executable, but not both [1]. Mac OS X,
FreeBSD, NetBSD and Solaris also have NX bit support for various processor archi-
tectures.
2.3 Return-to-Lib(c) Attacks
Return-to-lib(c) is an attack technique where the attacker overwrites a return address
or function pointer using techniques similar to those discussed in the previous sec-
tions, and diverts the control flow of the program to the beginning of a legitimate
function [33]. In this way, it is possible to exploit the functionality readily provided by
a program to mount an attack. The attacker can also create a fake frame on the stack
in order to control the arguments passed to the called function or execute a number of
different functions one after another [25].
Since there is no code injection involved in this process, non-executable memory
protection schemes are ineffective at securing programs against return-to-lib(c) attacks.
Although it is possible to call any function inside the program or return to any
library using this technique, libc, which is the shared library providing the C runtime
environment in Unix-like systems, is a very popular target. This is because almost
every binary executable in Unix-like systems link to libc, making it possible for an
attacker to construct generic exploits. Moreover, libc provides a number of low-
level and useful functions which facilitate the attacker’s intent to take over the system;
for instance, the libc function system would spawn a shell when invoked with the
argument “/bin/sh”.
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2.4 Proposed Defense Techniques
Several defense mechanisms attempt to detect memory corruption exploits which rep-
resent a fundamental basic block for mounting return-to-lib(c) attacks.
Stack-Guard [13] is a compile-time solution that aims to detect stack-based over-
flows by monitoring the integrity of the stack. It instruments each function with a pro-
logue responsible for placing a canary value between a function’s local variables and
its return address, and an epilogue for validating the integrity of the canary. Conse-
quently, simple stack-based overflow attemps are caught since the overflown data also
overwrites and invalidates the canary. ProPolice [20] extends StackGuard by reorder-
ing function parameters and local variables, in order to place them after the pointers
that could possibly be overwritten otherwise. PointGuard [12] encrypts pointers stored
in memory to prevent them from being corrupted. StackShield [38] uses a shadow re-
turn address stack in where the saved return addresses are duplicated; then the duplicate
is compared to the original at function exits to see whether they have been tampered
with. Similarly, StackGhost [19] presents a shadow return address stack for the SPARC
architecture. A complete survey of traditional mitigation techniques together with their
drawbacks is presented in [14].
One of the most effective techniques that hamper return-to-lib(c) attacks is Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [34]. In its general form, ASLR randomizes po-
sitions of stack, heap, and code segments together with the base addresses of dynamic
libraries inside the address space of a process. Consequently, an attacker is forced
to correctly guess the positions where these data structures are located to be able to
mount a successful attack. Despite the better protection offered by this mechanism, re-
searchers showed that the limited entropy provided by known ASLR implementations
can be evaded either by performing a brute-force attack on 32-bit architectures [32] or
by exploiting Global Address Table and de-randomizing the addresses of target func-
tions [27].
Chapter 3
Return-Oriented Programming
Before presenting the details of our approach, we would like to establish a more precise
and general model for the class of attacks we wish to prevent. Therefore, we generalize
the concept of return-oriented programming by abstracting away from all the details
that are specific to a particular attack technique.
Return-oriented programming is a generalization of known return-to-lib(c) attacks
[33, 25, 29] into a more sophisticated and powerful technique. The core idea of ROP is
“borrowing” sequences of instructions from existing code (either inside the application
or in the linked libraries) and chaining them together in an order chosen by the attacker.
Therefore, in order to use this technique, the attacker has to first identify a collection
of useful instruction sequences that she can later reuse as basic blocks to compose the
code to be executed. A crucial factor that differentiates return-oriented programming
from simpler forms of code reuse (such as traditional return-to-lib(c) attacks) is that
the collection of code snippets must provide a comprehensive set of functionalities that
allows the attacker to achieve Turing completeness without injecting any code [31].
The second step of return-oriented programming involves devising a mechanism to
manipulate the control flow in order to chain these different code snippets together,
and build meaningful algorithms.
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Note that these two requirements are not independent: To allow the manipulation
of the control flow, the instruction sequences must exhibit certain characteristics that
impose constraints on the way they are chosen. For example, sequences may have to
terminate with a return instruction, or they may have to preserve the content of a certain
CPU register. In this work, we use the term Gadget to refer to any valid sequence of
instructions that satisfies the control flow requirements. We must point out that, we
define a gadget in a slightly different way from the rest of the literature: Whereas
past work refers to a combination of many short instruction sequences that perform a
useful task (e.g., an addition operation) as a gadget, we say each of these sequences
are separate gadgets (Of course, they can still be chained together when needed). In
this way, we strive to refrain from making restrictive assumptions imposed by possible
definitions of what a useful task is, and thus we make our discussion as general as
possible.
3.1 Programming with Gadgets
IA-32 instruction set provides a pair of instructions, ret and call, to facilitate func-
tion calls. When call is executed, the CPU first pushes the address of the next instruc-
tion, the return address, onto the stack and then jumps to the specified target, which
is usually the beginning of the called function. After the called function performs its
task, it executes the ret instruction, which pops the previously saved return address
from the stack and jumps to it, back to the callee.
In the most basic form of the ROP attack, attackers exploit this property of ret
instructions which makes it possible to implicitly jump to an address stored on top of
the stack. As a consequence, Shacham initially defined gadgets as useful snippets of
code that terminate with a ret instruction [31]. The desired control flow is achieved
by placing the addresses of these gadgets on the stack and then exploiting the ret
instructions at the end of each gadget to fetch and copy the next address from the stack
to the instruction pointer. In other words, if we consider each gadget as a monolithic
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Stack Top
%esp xorl %edx, %edx
ret
incl %edx
ret
subl %edx, %eax
ret
Address of
Gadget C 
Address of
Gadget B 
Address of
Gadget A 
Figure 3.1: Stack frame demonstrating how to perform a simple substraction operation
using return-oriented programming
instruction, the stack pointer plays the role of the instruction pointer in a normal pro-
gram, transferring control flow from one gadget to the next.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the described process with a simple example task: sub-
tracting “1” from the value inside the register %eax. In order to bootstrap ROP, the
attacker crafts the fake stack frame containing the addresses of “Gadget A”, “Gadget
B” and “Gadget C” using a stack corruption vulnerability. Afterwards, when the pro-
gram executes a ret, the address of “Gadget A” is popped and copied to the instruc-
tion pointer, and return-oriented execution starts. The first instruction to be executed,
“xorl %edx, %edx”, sets %edx to zero. Then next instruction of the current gad-
get, ret, executes, popping and copying the value at the top of the stack (the address
of “Gadget B”) into the instruction pointer; and thus chaining the two gadgets. In a
similar fashion, “Gadget B” first executes “incl %edx”, setting %edx to “1”, and
then the following ret copies the address of “Gadget C” into the instruction pointer.
“Gadget C” performs the final step, “subl %edx, %eax”, decrementing %eax by
one, and finally executes a ret to chain to the following gadget if there is any.
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Stack Top
%esp popl %ebx
ret
popl %ecx
ret
movl %ebx, 48(%ecx)
ret
Address of
Gadget C 
target_addr - 48 
Address of
Gadget B 
0xdeadbeef 
Address of
Gadget A 
Figure 3.2: Stack frame demonstrating how to load an immediate value into memory
using return-oriented programming
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The attacker need not have only gadget addresses in the crafted stack, but may
also use stack locations to store immediate values, memory operands and temporary
values. Figure 3.2 shows how to load the immediate value 0xdeadbeef into a certain
memory location target addr. “Gadget A” pops the top of the stack, which is the
immediate value specified by the attacker and stores it in %ebx. Now that the top of
the stack contains the address of “Gadget B”, the following ret successfully chains
to the next gadget. “Gadget B” pops the next value into %ecx, which is our target
memory location minus 48. This is because, “Gadget C” can only write to the memory
address %ecx+481. The following ret chains to the final gadget, “Gadget C”, which
loads 0xdeadbeef to the memory at the address target addr.
Shacham [31] showed that, using these simple chaining mechanics, it is possible
to find sufficient gadgets inside the libc binary distributed as part of Fedora Core
Release 4 to form a Turing complete gadget catalog for the x86 architecture. In or-
der to highlight the significance of this attack, researchers proposed variants of ROP
that are suitable for various processor architectures such as SPARC, PowerPC, ARM,
Atmel AVR and Z80 [8, 16, 36, 17, 9]. Hund et al. [21] proposed a system that can
automatically extract gadgets from kernel code and translate any program written in
their dedicated language to return-oriented programs; they have also demonstrated the
feasibility of mounting ROP attacks at the kernel level [21].
The use of ret instructions is just one possible way of chaining gadgets together.
In a recent refinement of the technique [10], Checkoway and Shacham propose a vari-
ant of ROP in which return-like instructions are employed to fetch the addresses from
the stack. A return-like instruction or instruction sequence do not actually contain any
ret operations, but carry similar semantics. For an example, consider the instruction
sequence “popl %eax; jmp *%eax”, which behaves in the exact same way as a
ret: pop an address from the stack and jump to it. In fact, any jmp instruction could
be a return-like instruction as long as the jump destination is a ret (or return-like)
instruction.
1Such restrictions are also common in extracted real-world gadgets since we may not find a gadget
for our every specific need; regardless, it is possible to construct the desired semantics by using a number
of different gadgets or by carefully crafting operands as shown in this example.
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In their work, Checkoway and Shacham show that it is still possible to find a Turing
complete gadget collection in libc without utilizing any ret instructions. However,
because “popl %reg; jmp *%reg” style sequences are quite rare in regular bi-
naries, indirect jumps, specifically jmp *(%edx) instructions, are used as gadget
terminators, where %edx points to a memory location storing the address of a previ-
ously identified return-like sequence.
In practice, it is possible to use any return-like sequence mixed with regular ret
instructions to extract even larger gadget collections. Although there are no practical
examples yet, in theory, it is even possible to exploit other non-return-like instruc-
tions such as call *%reg, for instance, to directly jump between gadgets without a
return-like linking mechanism, or to design control flow manipulation techniques that
are not stack-based, but that store values in other memory areas accessible at runtime
by an attacker (e.g., on the heap or in global variables).
As a result, in order to find a general solution to the ROP threat, we need to iden-
tify a property that all possible variants of return-oriented programming have in com-
mon. Kornau [36] identified such a property in the fact that every gadget, in order to
be reusable, has to end with a “free-branch” instruction, i.e., an instruction that can
change the program control flow to a destination that is (or that can be under certain
circumstances) controlled by the attacker. According to this definition, in each gadget,
we can recognize two parts: the code section that implements the gadget’s functionality
and the linking section that contains the instructions used for transferring the control
flow to the next gadget. We can identify the following types of free-branch instructions
in the IA-32 instruction set:
• Return Instructions (ret): There are four different types of ret instructions
encoded by the opcodes 0xc3, 0xc2, 0xcb, and 0xca. These opcodes resp-
sectively encode a regular return instruction, a return with stack unwinding, a
far return (return into a different memory segment), and a far return with stack
unwinding. They are regarded as free-branch instructions since an attacker can
specify the return destination by injecting values into the stack. Although, the
CHAPTER 3. RETURN-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING 15
latter three are slighlty harder to use in an actual attack, it is still possible to
utilize them by crafting the stack frame carefully.
• Indirect Jump Instructions (jmp *%reg, jmp *offset(%reg)): Indi-
rect jumps can either jump to an address specified in a register or at a memory
location. For the first case, an attacker can assign a target of choice to the register
operand using other gadgets; for the second, she can use a memory corruption
exploit or again utilize other gadgets to manipulate the memory. Therefore, such
instructions are valid free branches. Indirect jumps have already been shown
to be useful as return-like instructions, as we have previously discussed in this
section; but they can also be used for jumping directly between gadgets.
• Indirect Call Instructions (call *%reg, call *offset(%reg)): In
the exact same way as indirect jumps, destination of indirect calls can be ma-
nipulated by an attacker, making them free-branch instructions. Of course, it
is trickier to utilize them since they push an extra return address value onto the
stack upon execution. However, it could be possible to discard the extra value in
a following gadget, e.g. through a pop operation.
As a final note, the linking section of a gadget has to end with a free branch, but it
can also contain additional instructions. For instance, a possible linking section could
be the sequence “popl %ebx; call *%ebx”, where the first instruction allows
the attacker to control the target of the following indirect call.
3.2 Gadget Construction
One may argue that, it might not always be possible to find a sufficient number of free-
branch instructions in a given binary, or the instructions preceeding a free branch may
not have sufficient variety to build a Turing complete set (e.g., a ret instruction is al-
most always preceeded by a function prologue). However, in the x86 architecture, gad-
gets are not limited to sequences of actual instructions that exist in the program code.
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movl %edx, 0x4(%eax) movl %eax, 0x0805d0ff
addb $0xa3, %al call *%eaxGadget 2
Gadget 1
Gadget 3
addl $0x4, %esp
addb $0x5b, %al
popl %ebx popl %ebp ret
retpopl %ebp
Figure 3.3: Examples of different gadgets that can be extracted from a real byte se-
quence
Since the IA-32 instruction set does not have fixed-length instructions, the opcode that
will be executed depends on the starting point of execution in memory. Therefore, by
jumping in the middle of an existing instruction we are very likely to land on another
“unintended”, but perfectly legal instruction. Because of the very dense encoding of
IA-32 instruction opcodes, this approach yields many different gadgets that an attacker
can exploit.
We can use the alignment of the first and the last instruction of the sequence to
classify gadgets. In particular, we can identify the following three types of alignments2:
• Aligned gadgets: These are fully aligned gadgets that only use actual instruc-
tions present in the application code. However, they are not limited to the full
body of a function but often reuse only the last few instructions before the free
branch.
• Unaligned gadgets: These gadgets only contain unintended instructions in both
the code and the linking section.
• Aligning gadgets: These gadgets start by executing unintended instructions but
later re-synchronize to the correct instruction alignment in order to reach an
aligned free branch.
Figure 3.3 shows how these three different kinds of gadgets can be extracted from a
real byte sequence found in libc. “Gadget 1” is an aligned gadget that just reuses the
2The forth case, i.e. the one that starts with an aligned instruction and finishes with an unintended
one, is impossible to achieve because an aligned execution cannot dis-align itself.
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entire function tail. “Gadget 2” is an unaligned gadget that contains only unaligned in-
structions ending with the unintended call *%eax. Finally, “Gadget 3” is an align-
ing gadget, which starts by using an unintended add instruction, then re-synchronizes
with the normal execution flow, and ends by reaching the function return. This exam-
ple demonstrates how a short sequence of 14 bytes can be used for constructing many
possible gadgets. Considering that a common library such as libc contains almost
18K free-branch instructions and that each of them can be used to construct multiple
gadgets, it is not difficult for an attacker to find the functionality he needs to execute
arbitrary code.
Hence, if we can prevent the attacker from finding useful instruction sequences
that terminate with a free branch, we can prevent any return-oriented programming
technique. In the next Chapter, we present our approach to reach this goal.
3.3 Proposed Defense Techniques against ROP
Several approaches proposed by the research community aim at ensuring the integrity
of saved return addresses and, thus, impeding basic ROP attacks. Frantsen et al. [19]
presented a shadow return address stack implemented in hardware for the Atmel
AVR microcontroller, which can only be manipulated by ret and call instructions.
ROPdefender [23] uses runtime binary instrumentation to implement a shadow return
address stack where saved return addresses are duplicated and later compared with the
value in the original stack at function exits.
Other approaches [11, 15] aim to detect ROP-based attacks relying on the observa-
tion that return-oriented programs result in the execution of short instruction sequences
that end with frequent ret instructions. They propose to use dynamic binary instru-
mentation to count the number of instructions executed between two ret opcodes. An
alert is raised if there are at least three consecutive sequences of five or fewer instruc-
tions ending with a ret.
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While these techniques offer a certain level of protection against the basic ROP at-
tacks, they cannot address the exploits utilizing free-branch instructions different from
ret. Moreover, many of them suffer from severe performance and deployment issues
since runtime binary instrumentation requires monitoring the executed instructions;
and others rely on statistical approaches which frequently need to be tweaked as ROP
attacks evolve.
The most similar approach to ours is a compiler-based solution developed concur-
rently and in parallel to our work by Li et al. [22]. This system eliminates unintended
ret instructions through code transformations, and instruments all call and ret
instructions to implement return address indirection. Specifically, each call instruction
is modified to push an index value onto the stack that points to a return address table
entry, instead of the return address itself. Then, when a ret instruction is executed,
the saved index is used for looking up the return address from the table. This prevents
an attacker from utilizing stack frames containing the addresses of gadgets since saved
return addresses are not fetched from the stack.
Although this system is more efficient compared to the previous defenses, it is
tailored specifically for compiling kernel code and does not provide a generic defense
framework like we do with our approach. Moreover, the implementation requires man-
ual modifications to all the assembly routines. Finally, these techniques can only ad-
dress the basic ROP attacks that utilize ret instructions.
The solution we present in this thesis study is the first to address all free-branch
instructions, and the first that can be applied at compile-time to protect any binary
executable from ROP attacks.
Chapter 4
Our Approach: Code without Gadgets
Our goal is to provide a proactive solution to build gadget-free executables that cannot
be targeted by any possible ROP attack. In particular, we strive to achieve a solution
that is:
• comprehensive: Our solution must eliminate all possible gadgets by removing
the linking mechanisms that are necessary to chain instruction sequences to-
gether.
• transparent: This process must be fully automated and it must require no inter-
vention from the user, such as manual modifications to source code.
• safe: The techniques we employ must preserve the semantics of the program,
be compatible with compiler optimizations, and support programs that contain
routines written in assembly language.
In order to reach our goals, we devise a compiler-based approach that first protects
the aligned free-branch instructions to prevent them from being misused by an attacker,
and then eliminates all unaligned free-branch instructions inside a binary executable.
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We achieve the first point by introducing a mechanism that protects potentially
dangerous free-branch instructions by ensuring that they can be executed only if the
functions in which they reside were started from their proper entry points. This leaves
the attacker with the only option of exploiting unaligned gadgets. We then diminish
this possibility through a set of code transformation techniques that ensure free-branch
instructions never appear inside any legitimate aligned instruction.
Consequently, an attacker can only execute entire functions from the start to the
end as opposed to running arbitrary code. This, effectively, de-generalizes the threat
to a traditional return-to-lib(c) attack, eliminating the advantages of achieving Turing
completeness without injecting any code in the target process.
Our approach uses a combination of different techniques, namely alignment sleds,
return address protection, frame cookies and code rewriting. The rest of this chapter
describes each technique in detail.
4.1 Free Branch Protection
The first set of techniques aim to protect the aligned free-branch instructions present in
the binary. These include the actual ret instructions at the end of each function and
the jmp*/call* instructions that are sometimes present in the code.
Unfortunately, these instructions cannot be easily eliminated without altering the
program’s behavior. In addition, replacing them with semantically equivalent pieces
of code is likely not going to solve the problem because the attacker could still use the
replacements to achieve the same functionality.
Therefore, we propose a solution inspired by existing stack protection mechanisms
(e.g., StackGuard [13]). The goal is to instrument functions with short blocks of code
to make sure that aligned free-branch instructions can only be executed if the running
function has been entered from its proper entry point. In particular, we employ two
complementary techniques: an efficient return address encryption to protect the ret
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instructions, and a more sophisticated cookie-based technique we additionally apply
only to those functions that contain jmp*/call* instructions. These techniques do
not require any modifications outside the active stack frame of the function. Thus,
our solution can be applied to reentrant or recursive functions, and can be utilized by
multi-threaded programs without concern.
Finally, we prepend the code performing the checks with alignment sleds. Align-
ment sleds are special sequences of bytes by which we enforce aligned execution of a
set of critical instructions. In particular, we use this technique to prevent an attacker
from bypassing our free branch protection code by executing it in an unaligned fashion.
4.1.1 Alignment Sleds
An alignment sled is a sufficiently-long sequence of bytes, encoding one or more in-
structions that have no effect on the status of the execution. Its length is set to ensure
that regardless of the alignment prior to reaching the sled, the execution will eventu-
ally land on the sled and execute it until the end. Even if an attacker jumps into the
binary at an arbitrary point and executes a number of unaligned instructions, when she
reaches the sled, the execution will be forced to realign with the actual code. Thus, it
will never reach any unintended opcode present in the instructions following the sled.
The simplest way to implement an alignment sled is to use a sequence of nop
instructions (see Figure 4.1 for an example). The number of nop instructions must
be determined by taking into consideration the maximum number of consecutive nop
bytes (0x90) that can tail a valid instruction. If we set the length to anything less than
that, an attacker could find an unintended instruction that encompasses the whole sled
and any number of bytes from the following instruction, in which case the execution
will continue in an unaligned fashion. In the IA-32 instruction set, the longest such
sequence becomes possible when we have both an address displacement and an im-
mediate value entirely composed of 0x90 bytes [6], which makes a total of 8 bytes.
Additionally, we can have either a ModR/M byte, a SIB byte or an opcode with the
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Figure 4.1: Application of an alignment sled to prevent executing an unaligned ret
(0xc3) instruction
value 0x90 (but only one of them at a time). As a result, we can safely set the number
of nop instructions in our sled to 9.
Note that the sled length calculation presented in this section is an over-
approximation. By also taking into account the bytes preceding the sled and which
instructions they can possibly encode, it is possible to automatically compute the re-
quired sled length case-by-case.
We also prepend the sled with a relative jump instruction to skip over the sled bytes.
Consequently, if the execution is already aligned, it will hit the jump and not incur the
performance penalty of executing the sequence of nop instructions.
4.1.2 Return Address Protection
Return address protection involves instrumenting the entry points of functions that
contain ret instructions with a short header that encrypts the saved return address
stored on the stack. Before each return instruction, we then insert a corresponding
footer to restore the saved return address to its original value. If an attacker jumps into
a function at an arbitrary position and eventually reaches our footer, the decryption
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routine processes the unencrypted return address provided by the attacker, computes
an invalid value and the following return instruction attempts to transfer the execution
flow to an incorrect address that the attacker cannot control. The encryption method
we utilize is a simple exclusive-or of the return address with a random key generated at
runtime. Since this solution does not affect the layout of the stack in any way, it does
not require any further modifications to the function code.
4.1.3 Frame Cookies
In order to prevent the attacker from using existing jmp*/call* instructions, we
need to adopt a similar strategy as we did with ret instructions. On the one hand,
we aim to permit correct execution of jmp*/call* only if the function execution
starts from a valid entry point; but on the other hand we cannot directly make use
of the previous return address encryption scheme. That is because, in the previous
case, encryption provided an implicit means to regulate the target of the control flow
transition, and we did not need to perform any check on the computed return value
– a wrong value automatically resulted in an invalid memory access. However, with
jmp*/call* the target destination is given in a register or a memory location, and
thus we must explicitly control it after doing the necessary checks to ensure proper
execution of the function.
To this end, we instrument the entry points of the functions that contain
jmp*/call* instructions with an additional header to compute and push a random
cookie onto the stack. This cookie is an exclusive-or of a random key generated at
runtime and a per-function constant generated at compile-time. The constant is used
for uniquely identifying the function and it does not need to be kept secret.
Next, we prepend all the jmp*/call* instructions with a validation block which
fetches the cookie, decrypts it, and compares the result with the per-function constant.
If the cookie is not found or the values do not match, we invalidate the jump/call
destination causing the application to crash. Finally, in the function footer, we insert a
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simple instruction to remove the cookie from the stack.
A significant consequence of using this technique is that we end up altering the
layout of the stack by storing an additional value inside. This requires us to fix the
memory offsets of some of the instructions that access the stack according to the loca-
tion where we store the cookie. We discuss the details of this issue in Chapter 5.
4.2 Code Rewriting
The second set of techniques we adopt in our approach focus on removing any un-
aligned free-branch instructions.
In the IA-32 instruction set, instructions consist of some or all of the following
fields: instruction prefixes, an opcode, a ModR/M byte, a SIB (Scale-Index-Base)
byte, an address displacement, and finally, an immediate value. A ret instruction
can be encoded with any of the 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xca or 0xcb bytes, and as such, can
be part of any of the instruction fields (excluding the prefixes). On the other hand,
jmp*/call* instructions are encoded by two-byte opcodes: the 0xff opcode fol-
lowed by an ModR/M byte carrying certain three-bit sequences. Hence, in addition to
appearing inside a single instruction, they can also be obtained by a combination of
two bytes coming from two consecutive instructions.
In this section, we discuss the various cases and describe the code rewriting tech-
niques we use to eliminate all unintended free-branch opcodes.
4.2.1 Register Reallocation
The ModR/M and the SIB bytes are used for encoding the addressing mode and the
operands of an instruction. The use of certain registers as operands cause either the
ModR/M or the SIB byte to be set to a value that corresponds to a ret opcode. The
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ModR/M Operand 1 Operand 2
0xc2 %eax, %ax, %al %edx, %dx, %dl
0xc3 %eax, %ax, %al %ebx, %bx, %bl
0xca %ecx, %cx, %cl %edx, %dx, %dl
0xcb %ecx, %cx, %cl %ebx, %bx, %bl
Table 4.1: ModR/M values encoding ret opcodes
SIB Base Scaled Index
0xc2 %edx %eax*8
0xc3 %ebx %eax*8
0xca %edx %ecx*8
0xcb %ebx %ecx*8
Table 4.2: SIB values encoding ret opcodes
possible undesired encodings of these bytes are shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. For
instance, an instruction that specifies %eax as the source operand and %ebx as the
destination, such as “movl %eax, %ebx”, assigns the value 0xc3 to the ModR/M
byte. Similarly, using %edx as the base and (%ecx * 8) as the scaled index, the
instruction “addl $0x2a,(%edx,%ecx,8)” would contain 0xca in its SIB byte.
In order to eliminate the unintended ret opcodes that result from such circum-
stances, we must avoid all of the undesired register pairings listed in Table 4.1 and
Table 4.2. We achieve this by manipulating the register allocation performed during
compilation to ensure that those pairs of registers never appear together in a generated
instruction. When we detect such an instruction, we can perform the compiler’s reg-
ister allocation stage again, this time enforcing a different register assignment. As an
alternative, we can perform a local reallocation by temporarily swapping the contents
of the original operand with a new register, and then rewriting the instruction with
this new register as its operand. In this way, we can bring forth an acceptable register
pairing for the same instruction.
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In some cases, the ModR/M byte could be used to specify an opcode extension and
a single register operand. In such cases certain pairs of opcode extensions and register
operands could encode a ret byte in a similar fashion (e.g., “addl $0xFFFFFFFF,
%ebx” is encoded as “0x81 0xc3 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff”). It is possible to
rewrite these instructions using the same techniques described above to replace the
register operand with a different one and eliminate the ret opcode.
Similarly, most floating point instructions are encoded by an opcode and an op-
code extension given inside the ModR/M byte. FPU instructions that have certain
opcode extensions and that operate on either of the floating point registers %st(2) or
%st(3) cause the ret byte 0xc2 or 0xc3 to appear in their ModR/M byte respec-
tively (e.g., fld %st(2) is represented as 0xd9 0xc2). Since many FPU instruc-
tions use implicit operands that cannot be substituted with different ones, applying
register reallocation techniques in these cases is not trivial. However, all such instruc-
tions can have the ret opcode only in their second bytes. Therefore, we prepend
them with an alignment sled leaving only the instruction’s opcode between the sled
and the unintended ret. This makes it impossible for the attacker to create any gadget
utilizing this unintended ret.
4.2.2 Instruction Transformations
ret bytes appear in the opcodes encoding the instructions movnti (0x0f 0xc3)
and bswap (0x0f 0xc8+<register identifier>). In the first case, the in-
struction movnti acts like a regular mov operation except that it uses a non-temporal
hint to reduce cache pollution. Thus, we can safely replace it with a regular mov with-
out any significant consequence. For the second, the opcode is determined according
to the operand register and can encode a ret byte when certain registers are specified
as the operand; consequently, as described in the previous section, we can perform a
register reallocation to choose a different operand and obtain a safe bswap opcode.
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4.2.3 Jump Offset Adjustments
Jump and call instructions may contain free-branch opcodes when using immediate
values to specify their destinations. For instance, jmp .+0xc8 is encoded as “0xe9
0xc3 0x00 0x00 0x00”.
A free-branch instruction opcode can appear at any of the four bytes constituting
the jump/call target. If the opcode is the least significant byte, it is sufficient to append
the forward jump/call with a single nop instruction (or prepend it if it is a backwards
jump/call) in order to adjust the relative distance between the instruction and its desti-
nation1:
jmp .+0xc8 ⇒ jmp .+0xc9
nop
However, when the opcode is at a different byte position, the number of nop in-
structions we need to insert increase drastically (256 for the second, 64K for the third
and 16M for the last byte).
Although free-branch opcodes commonly appear at the second byte of the jump/-
call destinations (and inserting 256 NOPs is still a feasible solution), for the higher
order bytes, the situation is highly uncommon. For example, a jump offset encoded by
“0x00 0x00 0xc3 0x00” would indicate a 12MB forward jump. Considering the
fact that jump instructions are ordinarily used for local control flow transitions inside
a function, a 12MB offset would be infeasible in practice. Even if we were to come
across such an offset, possibly in call targets, we can relocate the functions or code
chunks addressed by the instruction to remove the opcodes.
1In the x86 architecture, all immediate jump targets are specified relative to the following instruction.
Only indirect jumps use absolute targets.
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4.2.4 Immediate and Displacement Reconstructions
Several arithmetic, logic and comparison operations can take immediate values as an
operand, which may contain free-branch instruction opcodes. We can remove these by
substituting the instruction with a sequence of different instructions that construct the
immediate value in steps while carrying the same semantics. The following examples
demonstrate the reconstruction process, assuming that %ebx is free or has been saved
beforehand:
addl $0xc2, %eax ⇒ addl $0xc1, %eax
inc %eax
xorb $0xca, %al ⇒
movb $0xc9, %bl
incb %bl
xorb %bl, %al
Instructions that perform memory accesses can also contain free-branch instruction
opcodes in the displacement values they specify (e.g., movb %al, -0x36(%ebp)
represented as “0x88 0x45 0xca”). In such cases, we need to substitute the in-
struction with a semantically equivalent instruction sequence that uses an adjusted dis-
placement value to avoid the undesired bytes. We achieve this by setting the displace-
ment to a safe value and then compensating for our changes by temporarily adjusting
the value in the base register. For example, we can perform a reconstruction such as:
movb $0xal, -0x36(%ebp) ⇒
incl %ebp
movb %al, -0x37(%ebp)
decl %ebp
4.2.5 Inter-Instruction Barriers
Unintended jmp*/call* opcodes can result from the combination of two consecu-
tive instructions. This happens when the last byte of an instruction is 0xff and the
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first byte of the following instruction encodes a suitable opcode extension. We can
remove these unintended jmp*/call* opcodes by inserting a barrier between two
such instructions, effectively separating them and destroying the unintended opcode.
For the barrier, the trivial choice of a nop instruction is not suitable since an 0xff
followed by a 0x90 still encodes an indirect call. Thus, we have to choose a safe
nop-like alternative, such as “movl %eax, %eax”.
4.3 Limitations of the Approach
By applying the techniques presented in this section, we can remove all unaligned
free-branch instructions from the application binary, and protect the aligned ones from
being misused by an attacker. However, since our protection mechanism does not
remove the aligned free branches, but instead prepends a short piece of code to protect
them, the result of the compilation will still contain some gadgets.
In fact, an attacker may attempt to skip the alignment sled by directly jumping into
the return address or indirect jump/call protection blocks. This may result in executing
a useful instruction sequence (intended or unintended) which terminates at the free-
branch instruction we protect without actually executing the checks in our protection
block.
However, since our approach only requires inserting two very short pieces of code,
the number of possible gadgets that can be built is very limited and the gadget sizes
are restricted to few instructions. By keeping this issue in mind, it is therefore possible
to specifically craft the return address and indirect jump/call protection blocks to make
sure they do not contain any convenient gadgets.
We discuss the particular techniques we used in our prototype implementation, and
the number and type of gadgets that are left in the binaries compiled by our tool in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 5
Implementation
In this section, we describe G-Free, a prototype system we developed based on the
techniques presented in Chapter 4, and we discuss some of the issues we encountered
while compiling glibc using our prototype.
Our implementation efforts primarily focus on creating a fully-automated system
that would not require any modifications to the program’s source code or to the existing
compilation tools. Unfortunately, system-wide libraries, which are the primary targets
of ROP attacks, often rely on hand-tuned assembly routines to perform low-level tasks.
This makes a pure compiler-based solution unable to intercept part of the final code.
Therefore, we implemented our prototype in two separate components: an assembly
code pre-processor designed to work as a wrapper for the GNU Assembler (gas),
and a simple binary analyzer responsible for gathering some mandatory information
that is not available in the assembly source code.
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5.1 Assembly Code Pre-Processor & Binary Analyzer
The assembly code pre-processor intercepts the assembly code generated by cc1 (the
GNU C compiler included in the GNU Compiler Collection) or coming di-
rectly from an assembly language source file. It then performs the required modifica-
tions to remove all the possible gadgets, and finally passes the control to the actual
gas assembler.
We must stress that in this implementation we modify neither the compiler nor
the assembler; both are completely oblivious to the existence of our pre-processing
stage. We only replace the gas executable with a small wrapper that is responsible for
invoking our pre-processor before executing the assembler.
Our system successfully handles assembly routines written using non-standard pro-
gramming practices. Moreover, it supports compiler optimizations, including all of the
GCC standard optimization levels (in fact, glibc does not compile if GCC optimiza-
tions are disabled).
There is one significant implication of directly working with assembly code: Our
pre-processor is not exposed to the numeric values of immediate operands and mem-
ory displacements since these are often represented by symbolic values until linkage.
Thus, it is not possible for us to identify all of the instructions that contain unintended
free-branch opcodes just by looking at the assembly code. In order to address this
issue, we use a two-step compilation approach. First, our system compiles a given
program without doing any modifications to the original code. During this compi-
lation, our pre-processor tags each of the instructions that contain immediate values
or displacements with unique symbols. This information is then exported in the fi-
nal executable’s symbol table. In a second step, we use a binary analyzer to read the
symbol table of the executable and check whether any of the instructions pointed to
by our tagged symbols needs to be rewritten because it contains unaligned free-branch
instructions. This analysis produces a log of the tags corresponding to the instructions
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we need to modify. This log is consumed afterwards by the pre-processor during a sec-
ond compilation phase in order to provide it with the previously missing information.
The entire process is performed in an automated manner.
5.2 Obtaining Random Keys
As described in Chapter 4, our approach requires a random value to encrypt both the re-
turn address and the cookie stored on the stack. For this purpose, our prototype inserts
a key generation routine at the beginning of the program’s entry point (or initialization
routine if it is a library). In our prototype, this routine simply reads a 32-bit random
value from the Linux special file /dev/random and stores the value in a global memory
location.
If the attacker has a way to read arbitrary memory locations before performing the
actual attack, he could be able to fetch the per-process random key and use it to craft
the required values on the stack to defeat our implementation. This limitation is com-
mon to many canary-based stack protection mechanisms such as StackGuard [13] and
ProPolice [20]. However, this problem can be avoided by substituting the per-process
random key with a per-function key computed at runtime in the function headers.
5.3 Stack Reference Adjustments
We store our cookie just above the saved return address in the stack, shifting the frame
base upwards by 4 bytes. Since a function usually uses the %ebp register to reference
the stack relative to the frame base, and our cookie is located below the frame base,
references to the stack local variables remain unchanged. On the contrary, references
to function parameters which are stored below the frame base, and therefore below our
cookie, need to be adjusted by 4 bytes (See Figure 5.1).
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Stack Top
%esp
%ebp
Stack Top
%esp
%ebp
%ebp + 8
%ebp + 12 %ebp + 12
%ebp + 16
Parameter 1
Parameter 2
Saved Ret
Saved %ebp
Local Data
Parameter 1
Parameter 2
Saved Ret
Saved %ebp
Local Data
Cookie
Figure 5.1: Stack frame before and after inserting a cookie
We achieve this by simply correcting each positive displacement to %ebp by
adding to it the size of our cookie:
movl 0x8(%ebp), %eax ⇒ movl 0xc(%ebp), %eax
Note that compiler optimizations that adopt Frame Pointer Omission (FPO) use
the stack pointer to reference arguments and local variables. In this case, we need
to compute the displacement of the stack pointer to the function’s frame at any given
position in the function in order to identify and fix the references and locate our cookie
in the stack. This requires a comprehensive stack depth analysis. We have designed our
pre-processor to perform this analysis on-the-fly without the need for any extra pass
over the source file, even when the execution flow of the processed function is non-
linear. We keep track of push & pop operations and arithmetic computations on the
stack pointer and update the system’s view of stack depth accordingly. Additionally,
we record the current stack depth at each jump instruction together with the jump
destination, and then restore the state when we arrive at the recorded destination, which
successfully simulates analyzing different execution branches separately for changes to
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the stack pointer. Depending on the state of the stack, we can then determine whether a
stack access (e.g., 120(%esp)) points to a local variable or to a function’s parameter,
so that we can apply the displacement adjustment where appropriate.
5.4 Conditional Code Rewriting
Our prototype implements all immediate and displacement reconstruction strategies
we described in Chapter 4. However, to reduce the performance overhead, we apply
those transformations only when absolutely necessary. Otherwise, we use a faster ap-
proximate solution. In particular, during the compilation, we prepend each instruction
that contains free-branch opcodes among its immediate or displacement fields with
an alignment sled in order make it impossible to reach the unintended opcodes inside.
This allows us to avoid the performance costs of multiple-step immediate/displacement
reconstruction instructions and get away with executing a single-cycle jmp instruction.
However, this approach might not always be sufficient to remove all possible gad-
gets; merely the bytes of the protected instruction could still encode a number of valid
instructions ending with a free-branch opcode and an attacker could jump into the pro-
tected instruction to utilize these as a gadget (e.g., “pushl $0xffc38913’’ -
68 89 13 c3 ff includes the gadget “movl %edx, (%ebx); ret’’ - 89
13 c3). In order to address such issues, our system automatically checks these bytes
after the compilation. If it detects that they do indeed contain valid instructions, it falls
back to the safer (but slightly less efficient) immediate or displacement reconstruction
methods. This process does not require a recompilation; we use the space occupied by
the sled to write the new gadget-free instruction sequence.
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50 pushl %eax
a1 00 f0 fd b7 movl 0xb7fdf000, %eax
31 44 24 04 xorl %eax, 0x4(%esp)
58 popl %eax
Figure 5.2: Code inserted to protect the aligned return instructions
50 pushl %eax
a1 00 f0 fd b7 movl 0xb7fdf000, %eax
35 76 1f 0f 0f xorl $0x0f0f1f76, %eax
39 45 04 cmpl %eax, 0x4(%ebp)
58 popl %eax
74 02 jz freebranch
31 d2 xorl %edx, %edx
freebranch:
ff e2 jmp *%edx
Figure 5.3: Code inserted to protect the aligned indirect jump/call instructions
5.5 Return Address and Indirect Jump/Call Protection
Blocks
As previously explained in Chapter 4, our solution protects aligned free-branch in-
structions by introducing two short blocks of code: the return address protection block
and the indirect jump/call protection block (the current implementations are shown in
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3). These two pieces of code are the only ones in the final ex-
ecutable that can still contain gadgets, and therefore, they must be carefully designed
to prevent any possible attack.
The return address protection code is 11 bytes long and all bytes are under our con-
trol, with the exception of the 4-byte address of the random key, which could change
for each compiled program and for shared libraries at each relocation. To ensure that
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the code is safe to use, we need to prevent this value from containing potentially dan-
gerous instructions. In our implementation, we control the least significant two bytes
by automatically inserting appropriate alignment directives into the assembled code
when defining the key storage location, ensuring that the address always ends with
the innocuous “0xf0 0x00” sequence. In addition, according to the Linux process
memory layout, the most significant address byte of the .bss section (where we store
our random key) is limited in practice to 0x08 for regular ELF executables and 0xb*
for shared libraries 1. Therefore, it encodes either a variation of a load immediate into
register instruction (e.g., “mov $IMM, %reg”), or an or instruction between two
8-bit operands. All in all, only the third byte can still be considered arbitrary. We do
not further attempt to control that value; because even in the worst possible scenario,
it would introduce just a single fixed gadget in the whole executable. This obviously
cannot satisfy the requirements of Turing completeness, such as the ability to modify
memory locations and to implement conditional jumps.
The indirect jump/call protection block is 19 bytes long and contains an addi-
tional 4-byte dynamic section: the per-function constant identifier we generate at
compile time to compute the cookie. The example shown in Figure 5.3 (that uses
a 0x0f0f1f76 function identifier) is entirely gadget-free because it contains no
aligned or unaligned instruction sequences that would make it possible for an attacker
to reach jmp *%edx without invalidating its contents. In fact, any logic/arithmetic
operation that does not yield a result of zero (e.g., incl %ebp, unless %ebp over-
flows) clears the zero flag in the processor and would prevent the use of the conditional
jump jz .+42. Consequently, the value inside %edx is cleared.
Different values of the function identifier could potentially introduce a new and
useful gadget; but since these constants can be arbitrarily chosen and do not need to
be kept secret, we can easily work around problematic cases. In order to minimize the
risk in the first place, we use simple heuristics such as using bytes that represent invalid
1The Linux process memory layout dictates that dynamic shared libraries are loaded at the address
range 0xc0000000-0x40000000, starting from higher addresses. As a result, in practice almost
any shared library has 0xb* as the most significant address byte of its .bss section.
2The conditional jump jz only jumps when the zero flag is set in the processor
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Gadget 1
00 f0 addb %dh, %al
fd std
b7 31 movb $0x31, %bh
44 incl %esp
24 04 andb $0x04, %al
58 popl %eax
f0 fd lock std
b7 31 movb $0x31, %bh
44 incl %esp
24 04 andb $0x04, %al
58 popl %eax
Gadget 2
04 58 addb $0x58, %al
Gadget 3
Figure 5.4: Gadgets available in the return address protection block
opcodes (e.g., 0x0f 0x0f) and avoiding dangerous opcodes such as those encoding
mov or free-branch instructions.
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 shows all the gadgets that can be extracted from our
current system implementation. As can be seen, apart from the ability to load the
%eax with a controlled value (popl %eax), the gadgets have no value.
5.6 Compiling glibc
During our case study of compiling glibc using G-Free, we have encountered several
issues requiring particular care. These were mostly related to unconventional program-
ming practices used for dealing with low-level tasks, or manually optimized assembly
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45 incl %ebp
04 58 addb $0x58, %al
74 02 jz freebranch
31 d2 xorl %edx, %edx
freebranch:
ff e2 jmp *%edx
Figure 5.5: Gadget available in the indirect jump/call protection block
code. This section explains our observations in this regard, and explains how we cope
with these special cases.
5.6.1 Multiple Entry Points
We have come across various functions in glibc that include more than one possible
entry point. Our system successfully detects such functions and instruments all entry
points with the appropriate headers. Additionally, we prepend each header that lies in
the execution path of other entry points with a jump instruction to skip over the header,
ensuring that only one header is executed per function call.
5.6.2 Functions that Access the Saved Return Address
In glibc, we have encountered a single function, namely setjmp that accesses the
saved return address on the stack. setjmp, together with the function longjmp,
is used for implementing non-local jumps: a call to setjmp saves the current stack
context to restore it afterwards when longjmp is invoked. This behavior conflicts
with our return address protection scheme. Since the return address is stored in an
encrypted form on the stack, a call to setjmp saves the encrypted return address
and a subsequent call to longjmp results in an illegal memory access. In order to
solve this problem, we modified our prototype to detect when the saved return address
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is moved to a register and perform the decryption on the duplicated value to ensure
correct functionality.
5.6.3 Jumps between Functions
In numerous cases, a function directly jumps to another one without saving the return
address, essentially making that jump an exit point. During compilation, we check
every jump destination to recognize jumps outside the current function and treat them
as regular exit points for inserting the necessary footers. These footers are not meant to
protect a free-branch instruction, since none follows, but to restore the return address
to its original value before transferring the execution flow to another function.
5.6.4 Position Independent Code (PIC) Addressing Issues
Shared libraries, including glibc, need to be compiled as position independent ex-
ecutables (PIE) so that they work correctly regardless of the address they are loaded
at in the memory. Such executables cannot directly access global data; because their
address is not known until the code is loaded.
To overcome this obstacle, a data structure, called the Global Offset
Table (GOT), is responsible for storing the absolute addresses of global data. Pro-
grams then access GOT and use its entries to locate the desired pieces of data. However,
GOT cannot be directly referenced for the same reasons as well.
Thus, PIEs compute the absolute address of the GOT programmatically by first
getting the current value of the instruction pointer, and then adding to it the relative
distance to GOT. The following example gives an excerpt from glibc source code
demonstrating this process:
call __i686.get_pc_thunk.cx
addl $_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_, %ecx
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The function i686.get pc thunk.cx stores the address of the following in-
struction in %ecx. Then the symbol which will resolve to the relative distance between
the addl instruction and the GOT is added to %ebx, to get the absolute address of the
GOT.
Remember that, if an immediate value contains a free-branch opcode we
prepend it with an alignment sled. Considering the given example, if
$ GLOBAL OFFSET TABLE contains such an opcode and we insert a sled in be-
tween the instructions, we end up breaking the absolute value computation. This is
because, when we reach the addl instruction, %ecx does not contain the current ad-
dress anymore, it falls short by the length of the sled. In order to fix this problem,
we detect all such computations and correct the add operation to compensate for the
length of the sled. For instance, the above addl instruction becomes:
addl $_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+<sled_length>, %ecx
5.7 Limitations of the Implementation
When inserting a nop at a certain position to fix a jump offset, we may actually affect
the offsets of many other jumps since this process alters the whole address space of
the binary. Our prototype binary analyzer does not consider the overall structure of the
binary file when reporting the instructions to fix. Therefore, while fixing a set of jump
offsets, several other offsets may start to contain free-branch opcodes. This makes it
necessary to perform several compilations until all the offsets are fixed.
Note that in this process, we may need to fix a single jump instruction several times.
However, since inserting nop instructions between a jump and its destination can only
increase the offset but never decrease it, we are sure to find a safe offset after a finite
number of iterations.
A more optimized analyzer that can perform a global analysis and take into account
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the target of every jump instruction would eliminate this problem. It would also pro-
duce smaller executables since the various recompilations may insert many otherwise
unnecessary nop instructions.
Chapter 6
Evaluation
The main goal of our evaluation is to show that our solution can be applied for com-
piling real-world applications and producing gadget-free executables. To demonstrate
that we are able accomplish this goal, we compiled glibc and a number of com-
mon Linux applications using G-Free. We then investigated the impact of our binary
modifications on the file size of compiled files and performed a set of experiments to
measure the incurred performance overhead.
In our tests, we used G-Free in conjunction with gas 2.20 and GCC 4.4.3.
All the experiments were performed on a 2GHz Intel Core 2 Duo T7300 machine with
2GB of memory, running Arch Linux (i686) with Linux kernel 2.6.33.
6.1 Compilation Results
Since ROP attacks usually extract their gadgets from common libraries, we focus our
evaluation on glibc version 2.11.1. The original library compiled without G-Free
contains 9921 ret instructions (6106 of which unaligned) and 8018 jmp*/call*
instructions (6602 of which unaligned). This sums up to almost 18K free-branch op-
codes, each of which can be potentially used by an attacker to build many different
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Number of unaligned Number of functions
Program Name Version ret jmp*/call* with RAP with JCP
glibc 2.11.1 6106 6602 2817 827
gzip 1.4 433 410 122 10
grep 2.6.3 523 369 174 20
dd coreutils-8.5 252 181 95 8
md5sum coreutils-8.5 203 86 68 3
ssh-keygen openssh-5.5p1 607 712 271 20
lame 3.98.3 2228 1342 669 28
Table 6.1: Statistics on binaries compiled with G-Free (RAP=Return Address Protec-
tion, JCP=indirect Jump/Call Protection)
gadgets.
After we compiled glibc using our system, all unintended ret and
jmp*/call* instructions were either removed or made ineffective by prepending
them with an alignment sled. In addition, all aligned free-branch instructions were
protected by adding our return address and indirect jump/call protection blocks. As a
result, the library compiled with G-Free contained only the four types of gadgets we
have previously presented in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5.
However, due to the newly inserted code and instruction rewriting techniques, the
size of the gadget-free version of the library increased by 30%. Although this value
might appear to be high, one third of the overhead is caused by nop instructions in-
cluded in the alignment sleds. As already discussed in Chapter 5, most of these could
be eliminated by a more optimized implementation.
Unfortunately, providing a gadget-free version of glibc is not sufficient to com-
pletely prevent ROP attacks, since the attacker could still build the gadget set from
other libraries or the application binary itself. Therefore, to achieve a complete protec-
tion against ROP, it is necessary to compile the entire application and all its libraries
with our technique. To demonstrate that our tool can be applied to this more general
scenario, we include in our evaluation a number of common Linux applications.
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Size (KBs)
Program Name Original Version G-Free Version Overhead
glibc 1320.4 1728.4 30.9%
gzip 72.7 92.4 27.0%
grep 86.3 106.3 23.2%
dd 48.0 57.9 20.6%
md5sum 30.9 37.7 22.1%
ssh-keygen 140.6 182.5 29.7%
lame 322.6 406.6 26.0%
Table 6.2: The increase in size for binaries compiled with G-Free
Table 6.1 shows the number of unaligned free-branch instructions and the number
of functions requiring protection blocks that were available in the original binaries of
the programs we have performed our tests on. The last two columns of Table 6.1 show
that most of the functions can be protected by our efficient return address encryption
technique while very few of them required the more complex indirect jump/call pro-
tection block. This is a consequence of the fact that, according to what we observed in
our experiments, programs rarely use jmp*/call* instructions.
Table 6.2 lists the increase in size for each program compiled with G-Free com-
pared to the size of the original program binary. Our solution was able to provide
gadget-free binaries with an average size increase of 25.9% (more than half of which
were caused by redundant nop instructions).
6.2 Performance Measurements
Table 6.3 shows the performance overheads we measured by running the different ap-
plications compiled with our prototype (this includes the gadget-free versions of the
programs and all their linked libraries). For each application, we designed program-
specific test cases, which are summarized as:
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Execution Time (seconds)
Program Name Original Version G-Free Version Overhead
gzip 66.5 68.4 2.9%
grep 81.3 82.9 2.0%
dd 86.6 88.9 2.6%
md5sum 82.5 82.9 0.6%
ssh-keygen 51.2 53.6 4.6%
lame 115.5 122.0 5.6%
Table 6.3: Performance comparisons of common Linux applications when the appli-
cation and all the linked libraries are compiled with G-Free
• gzip: Compressing a 2GB file with random content.
• grep: Performing regular-expression-based string searches in a 2GB file.
• dd: Reading from the Linux special file “/dev/zero” and writing to a regular file
2G of zero bytes.
• md5sum: Computing the md5 hash of a 2GB file.
• ssh-keygen: Generating 100 2048-bit RSA keys.
• lame: Encoding a 10-minute wav file into mp3 format.
The average performance overhead was 3.1% – a value comparable with the overhead
caused by well known stack protection systems such as StackShield [38] and Stack-
Guard [13].
Since a library cannot be run as a standalone program, we evaluated the perfor-
mance overhead of our gadget-free version of glibc using a set of well-known bench-
marks. In particular, we used the Phoronix Test Suite [3] which provides one of the
most comprehensive benchmark sets for the Linux platform. Table 6.4 lists a sam-
ple of the benchmarks that represent different application categories such as games,
mathematical and physical simulations, 3D rendering, disk and file system activities,
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION 46
compression, and well-known server applications. The results indicate that the per-
formance overhead of an application using our gadget-free version of glibc is on
average 1.09%.
Benchmark Original Libc G-Free Libc Overhead
FS-Mark (Files/s) 15.1 14.9 1.3%
IOzone-read (MB/s) 23.0 22.7 1.4%
IOzone-write (MB/s) 22.8 22.6 0.4%
Minion (s) 250.2 250.7 0.2%
TSCP (Nodes/s) 224642.0 224385.0 0.1%
BYTE (Lines/s) 7288371.3 6948792.8 4.6%
PHP Comp (s) 102.9 107.3 4.3%
Unpack Linux Kernel (s) 30.30 31.01 2.3%
BZIP2 (s) 65.63 65.84 0.3%
Ogg Encoding (s) 27.14 27.20 0.2%
dcraw (s) 52.68 52.99 0.6%
Timed MAFFT (s) 52.48 52.55 0.1%
SQLite (s) 189.09 191.78 1.4%
x2642009 (Frames/s) 13.72 13.62 0.7%
x11perf (Operations/s) 912000 912000 0.0%
OpenArena (Frames/s) 46.93 46.67 0.6%
FFmpeg (s) 24.93 25.02 0.4%
OpenSSL (Signs/s) 25.28 25.28 0.0%
John The Ripper (Real C/S) 1854667 1857333 0.1%
Continued on next page
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Benchmark Original Libc G-Free Libc Overhead
Timed HMMer Search (s) 88.93 89.31 0.4%
Bwfirt (s) 284.9 285.3 0.2%
Dbench (MB/s) 83.7 82.0 2.0%
Sudokut (s) 97.1 100.4 3.5%
GMPbench (Score) 2955.5 2954.5 0.03%
PyBench (s) 6791.0 6959.0 2.5%
7-Zip (MIPS) 2822.0 2802 0.7%
LZMA (s) 291.67 291.86 0.01%
FLAC Audio Encoding (s) 12.96 13.09 1.0%
Himeno (MFLOPS) 152 151.44 0.4%
Bullet Physics Engine (s) 39.58 39.74 0.4%
PostgreSQL (Trans/s) 155.24 156.66 0.9%
Apache(Requests/s) 7129.05 6836.24 4.1%
GtkPerf (s) 20.89 20.49 1.9%
Urban Terror (Frames/s) 34.20 34.05 0.9%
C-Ray (s) 553.7 554.0 0.05%
GraphicsMagick (Iter/min) 45 44 2.2%
Gcrypt Library (micros) 6963 6983 0.3%
GnuPG (s) 20.46 20.67 1.0%
Average: 1.09%
Std: 1.27
Table 6.4: Performance comparison of the original and G-Free glibc using bench-
marks from the Phoronix Test Suite
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Return-oriented programming is an evolution of the return-to-lib(c) attack technique
and it recently attracted significant attention from the scientific community. Even
though much research has been conducted on the topic, no comprehensive defense
has been proposed to date.
With this thesis study, we propose a novel, comprehensive solution to defend
against return-oriented programming by removing all gadgets from a program binary
at compile-time. Our approach targets all possible free-branch instructions, and there-
fore, is independent from the techniques used for linking the gadgets together.
We implemented our solution in a prototype called G-Free, a pre-processor for the
GNU Assembler that does not require any modifications to any of the compilation
tools. Our experiments show that G-Free is able to remove all gadgets at the cost of a
very low performance overhead and an acceptable increase in the file size.
G-Free provides a general defense framework targeting both regular applications
and system libraries, it is fully automated, and is compatible with compiler optimiza-
tions. Hence, we satisfy our design goals of building a system that is comprehensive,
transparent and safe.
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